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SURGICALLY IMPLANTED MEDICAL DEVICE LIABILITY: WILL 
THE NEW RESTATEMENT HELP THE UNRAVELING SHIELD 
CREATED BY MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHHJ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Representing a plaintiff in medical device litigation against the de-
vice manufacturer prior to 1996 probably felt like David preparing to 
meet Goliath. l The 1996 preemption analysis utilized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,2 paved the way for 
various state actions to survive federal law preemption.3 However, 
questions remain regarding the reach of Lohr, which arguably dealt 
with only one aspect of a complex regulatory scheme.4 
This Comment begins by guiding the reader through the rationale 
for device control, the various levels of control based upon the pre-
sumed risks of device use, and the specific statutory provisions that 
preempt state law.5 Knowledge of these concepts is essential to under-
standing device use liability implications as the various controls create 
the legal duties imposed under federal law and regulation-duties 
that are not to be preempted by state law.6 
Medical devices are classified into three categories, Class I, Class II 
and Class III respectively, with each class subjected to greater regula-
tory control due to the potential risks associated with use. 7 After 
briefly discussing Class I and II devices, the Comment focuses on Class 
III medical devices as they create the gravest risk of injury from fail-
ure, and are the class of devices most often utilized in surgical 
procedures.s 
Subsequent to presenting the medical device preemption language, 
the Comment provides a brief history of preemption principles, and 
reviews how the Supreme Court originally analyzed similar statutory 
language.9 In addition, in this section, the Comment provides an 
overview of pre-Lohr Fourth Circuit preemption holdings, which essen-
tially closed the door to seeking redress for device failure. lo 
1. See infra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the likelihood 
of preemptive claims prior to a landmark 1996 Supreme Court case. 
2. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
3. See id. at 489. 
4. See infra note 176. 
5. See infra Parts II.A-B. 
6. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory 
preemption language. 
7. See infra Parts II.B.1-2. 
8. See infra Part 1I.B.2. 
9. See infra Part III.B.1. 
10. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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The Comment then exposes the new difficulties created in preemp-
tion analysis by providing a close, dissected look at Lohr. II In Lohr, the 
United States Supreme Court struggled to agree on the appropriate 
analysis, and deviated from precedent to reach a conclusion that pro-
vided the plaintiffs with a small opportunity for remedy.I2 Once 
presenting a framework for application of the Lohr opinion, the Com-
ment individually examines the various causes of action related to sur-
gically implanted medical device use. I3 The Comment focuses on 
how courts within the Fourth Circuit handle claims of preemption 
post-Lohr, and liability analyses falling outside of the preemptive 
scope. 14 Emphasis is placed upon manufacturing liability, although 
some interrelated discussions of downstream liability are presented. I5 
Legal principles advanced by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liabilityl6 ("Restatement (Third)") are woven into this discussionP For 
the most part the new Restatement does not depart significantly from 
the principles applied in products liability litigation within the Fourth 
Circuit. Is However, the new standard raises the bar to attach strict 
liability for injury due to defective design or manufacturing, although 
pro-technology might render the harmed person without recourse if 
adopted. 19 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE INTRICATE MEDICAL DEVICE STAT-
UTORY SCHEME 
Because medical devices move through interstate commerce, the 
federal government has great latitude to exert statutory control. 20 As 
with any federally controlled industry, it is important to understand 
the reach of the specific statutory provisions and corresponding 
regulations.21 
11. See infra Part lII.C. 
12. See infra Part III.C.3. 
13. See infra Parts IV.A-D. 
14. See infra Parts IV.A-F. 
15. See infra Parts IV. 
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)]. 
17. See infra Part IV.D. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Parts 1I1.C-D. 
20. United States v. Depilation Epilator Model No. DP-206 Universal Tech., 
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Congress may 
regulate medical devices that are sold and distributed among the several 
states). 
21. See, e.g., Merrit B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: 
A Therny o/Section J6(b), 92 MICH. L. REv. 2088,2096 (1994) (discussing the 
importance of understanding the reach of statutes and regulations in secur-
ities law). 
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A. The Federal Statutory Scheme: The Food and Drug Act of 1906 Through 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
Since the early days of federalism, the several states have enjoyed 
significant latitude in regulating matters affecting the health and 
safety of their individual citizens.22 Under their policing power, states 
could legislate, as necessary, to protect the health, lives and limbs of 
all persons residing within their borders.23 Industrialization and tech-
nological advances, however, opened the door for trade via interstate 
commerce, and therefore, the ability for the federal government to 
become increasingly involved in state affairs. 24 
Although the role of Congress in regulating interstate commerce 
changed over the years,25 Congress began to significantly impact the 
regulation of health matters by enacting the Food and Drug Act of 
1906 ("1906 Act").26 This legislation established a broad prohibition 
against the manufacture of any adulterated or misbranded food or 
drug placed in the stream of interstate commerce, or the actual ship-
ment through interstate commerce of such an item.27 
As legitimate health-care entities competed against charlatans to 
promote their new "state-of-the-art" medical devices, Congress identi-
fied a need to expand the 1906 Act to offer additional protection 
from the sale of unsafe medical devices.28 Consequently, Congress en-
acted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) , 
broadening the scope of protection to include misbranded or adulter-
ated medical devices.29 
Meanwhile, within the health-care industry, technological advances 
were leading to an increase in the types and sophistication of health-
care products entering the market. 30 These products had no govern-
22. Stanley E. Cox, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 50 OK. L. REv. 155,220 (1997). 
23. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (citing Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)). 
24. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Source of the Commerce Power, 73 
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1399-1454 (1987) (discussing the history offederal regula-
tion of interstate commerce as society advanced through the years). 
25. Id. 
26. 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
27. See id. 
28. See S. Rep. No. 94-33 (1975) (noting in section II that the 1930s reformers 
sought legislation to protect against "unsafe or quack devices"). 
29. 52 Stat. lO49-51 (1938). 
30. In 1938, when the FDCA was enacted, most medical devices were relatively 
simplistic, employing basic scientific concepts. Trained medical personnel 
who utilized these devices could often detect if the device was malfunction-
ing. Legislative concern was focused upon truthful advertising resulting in 
an emphasis on labeling requirements. In the 1960s, the focus shifted from 
fraudulent devices to hazards associated with legitimate medical device use. 
This was prompted by the increased complexity of medical devices such as 
heart pacemakers, kidney dialysis units, and artificial heart valves. Because 
of the sophisticated technology utilized, skilled medical personnel were no 
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mental control beyond the parameters of misbranding or adultera-
tion.31 Despite advantages to health-care advancements, the 
American public suffered :harm resulting from these new sophisti-
cated medical devices that were marketed as safe and effective for 
use.32 
In response to the mounting concern regarding public health and 
safety from consumer groups as well as legislators,33 Congress enacted 
the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to regulate device 
safety and effectiveness, including the entrance of medical devices 
into the stream of commerce.34 Recognizing that medical devices, 
based upon their design and use, presented the potential for grada-
tions of harm, the MDA provided a classification system subjecting 
each device class to increasingly stricter regulatory contro1.35 
B. Different Standards Based Upon Risk Potential 
1. Classification System 
Under the statute, Congress authorized the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services ("Secretary"),36 in conjunction with expert panels,37 
3l. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
longer able to determine if a device was defective or not. See S. Rep. No. 94-
33, pt. II, at 1 (1975). 
The FDCA additionally expanded public protection by providing for a 
premarket review process for new drugs. The statute required the submis-
sion of an application, including investigational reports, which became ef-
fective sixty days after filing. Once the dru~ became effective, it could be 
introduced into interstate commerce unless It was determined by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture that the drug was unsafe for its intended use. Interest-
ingly, these same protections were not implemented for new medical 
devices entering the market. See § 505, 52 Stat. 1052. 
In 1969, Dr. Theodore Cooper, Director of the National Heart and Lung 
Institute, headed a panel that searched scientific literature and found a 
recorded 10,000 injuries including 731 deaths from medical devices. For 
example, heart valves caused 512 deaths and 300 injuries, pacemakers 
caused 89 deaths and .186 injuries, and intrauterine devices caused 10 
deaths and 8,000 injuries. See S. Rep. No. 94-33, pt. II, at 6 (1975). 
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee held hearings over a two-
day period in 1973 when previous medical device legislation was intro-
duced. Testimony from various industrial, professional and consumer 
groups reflected agreement regarding the need for medical device legisla-
tion. See S. Rep. No. 94-33, pt. III, at 7 (1975) (providing a synopsis of the 
previous testimony). 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976,90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1976». 
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994). 
21 U.S.C. § 321 (d) (referring to the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices). The Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
was subsequently empowered to perform the "[£Junctions vested in the Sec-
retary under the [FDCA]." 21 C.F.R. § 5.IO(a)(I). 
The FDA is charged to appoint experts to the panel who are qualified to 
evaluate device safety and 'effectiveness because of their experience in de-
veloping, manufacturing or utilizing such medical devices. The FDA is fur-
ther required to ensure that there is a diverse range of expertise, such as 
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to classify devices into one of three categories.38 Class I is reserved for 
medical devices that are not used to support or sustain human life and 
do not present an unreasonable risk of illness or injury.39 For exam-
ple, medical devices such as ice bags, examination gloves, patient 
scales, crutches, non-electric wheelchairs, and hand-crank hospital 
beds receive Class I status.40 
More complex devices such as diagnostic x-ray machines, magnetic 
resonance imaging machines, electrocardiograph equipment, electric 
heating pads, electric wheelchairs and electric hospital beds fall within 
Class IIY These devices receive Class II designation because addi-
tional regulatory control42 is necessary to ensure device safety and 
effectiveness.43 
Finally, Class III is reserved for those devices that are life-support-
ing, life-sustaining or create a potentially unreasonable risk of harm.44 
Class III devices include hip prosthesis, pacemakers, intraocular 
lenses, pedicle screw fixation devices, inflatable penile prosthesis, 
heart valves, monitors to detect heart irregularities, anti-choking suc-
tion devices, silicone breast implants, and artificial knee joints.45 
2. Medical Device Controls 
Each class is subjected to different regulatory controls designed to 
"provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the 
device."46 Safety and effectiveness are determined by evaluating the 
intended user, the conditions of use, and by balancing the probable 
benefits against the probable risk of injury or illness.47 
38. 
39. 
40. 
4l. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
within areas of medicine, engineering, biology, and physics. In addition, 
expert panels must include nonvoting members who represent the views of 
both consumers and the manufacturing industry. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2). 
See id. § 360c(b)(1)(B) (providing power to classify all devices except those 
classified under subsection (f». 
Id. § 360c(a) (1) (A). 
21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6050 (ice bag), 880.6250 (examination gloves), 880.2720 
(scale), 890.3150 (crutches), 890.3850 (wheelchair), 880.5120 (hospital 
bed). 
21 C.F.R. §§ 892.1680 (x-ray), 892.1000 (MRI), 870.2340 (EKG), 890.5740 
(heating pad), 890.3860 (powered wheelchair), 880.5100 (adjustable bed). 
See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
See id. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3925 (valves), 870.1025 (heart arrhythmia detector), 
874.5350 (suction device), 878.3530 (implant), 888.3480 (knee joint). 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i); see also id. § 360c(a)(1) (A)-(C) (addressing 
Class I devices in subsection (A), Class II devices in subsection (B), and 
Class III devices in subsection (C». 
See id. § 360c(a) (2) (A)-(C). 
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a. General Controls 
All medical devices are subjected to "general controls."48 These in-
clude specified good manufacturing practices (GMP) , labeling re-
quirements, and certain standards for registration, notification, 
record keeping and reporting.49 In addition, federal statutes prohibit 
the manufacturing and introduction into interstate commerce of 
medical devices that are adulterated or misbranded. 50 Most Class I 
devices are exempt from additional regulatory controls because the 
"general controls" are adequate enough to ensure device safety and 
effectiveness. 51 
Some Class 152 and the remaining Class II and III devices are sub-
jected to quality system GMP regulations that set forth quality control 
standards. These standards include requirements to control device 
design, monitor production processes, utilize sufficient numbers of 
trained personnel who adhere to certain health and cleanliness stan-
dards and perform quality audits.53 
b. Special Controls 
In addition, Class II and III devices are subject to "special controls" 
because the general controls alone are deemed insufficient to reason-
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
Id. § 360c(a) (l)(A). 
See, e.g., id. §§ 360j(f) (empowering the Secretary to prescribe regulations 
for pre-production design validation, manufacturing controls, packing, 
storage and installation of devices to assure safety and effectiveness), § 360 
(b), (c), U> (requiring each medical device manufacturer to submit an ini-
tial and annual registration, including at the time of submission, a copy of 
the device label and packaging insert), § 360h(a) (2) (requiring health pro-
fessionals to notify patients treated with a certain medical device of a risk 
presented by the device and the necessary action to reduce or eliminate the 
risk), § 360i(a)-(b) (requiring manufacturers to maintain records and re-
ports with respect to safety and effectiveness, and more specifically, to re-
port adverse medical device use consequences, such as malfunctioning 
likely to cause serious irUury or death); 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.4, 801.15 (address-
ing labeling requirements such as stating the manufacturer's intended de-
vice use, labeling insufficiency such as inadequate information or space, 
and formatting limitations on print size, style, clarity and background 
contrast). 
See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a), (g); see also id. § 351 (g) (determining that a device 
banned from the market is deemed to be considered adulterated). 
See id. § 360c(a) (1) (A) (i). Even if it is not possible to determine that the 
general controls are adequate to provide reasonable safety assurances, the 
device would still escape further scrutiny if it did not present an unreasona-
ble risk of illness or injury and (1) was not intended to be used to support 
or sustain life, or (2) did not serve a substantial function in preventing 
impairment. See id. § 360c(a) (l)(A)(ii)(I). 
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 820.30 (subjecting items such as surgeon's gloves and 
patient protective restraints to quality system design controls). 
21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1, .22, .25, .30, .70. In addition, manufacturers of surgi-
cally implanted devices likely to result in significant injury, should the de-
vice fail to perform as intended, are required to batch and distribute the 
device using a control system to facilitate corrective action. Id. § 820.65. 
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ably ensure device safety and effectiveness.54 Special controls include 
requirements such as the establishment of patient registries, post-mar-
ket surveillance, and designated performance standards. 55 Desig-
nated performance standards include specifications for device 
construction, device testing to ensure adherence to established stan-
dards, specific labeling content and restrictions on device sale and 
distribution. 56 
c. Class III Designation-Premarket Approval Process 
When neither the general nor the specific controls provide reasona-
ble safety assurances of a device that either: (1) is intended to support 
or sustain life or is of substantial importance to prevent impairment; 
or (2) presents an unreasonable risk of illness, then a Class III desig-
nation is required.57 As a result of the inherent dangers, these devices 
are subjected to a premarket approval (PMA) process. 58 Under the 
PMA process, the device manufacturer must submit an application to 
the FDA.59 This application must contain full reports of investigations 
regarding device safety and effectiveness, a discussion of the device 
properties and mode of operation, a description of manufacturing 
and packaging methods, proposed labeling, and if required, device 
samples.60 In addition, regulations require the application to include 
clinical indications for device use, a description regarding how the 
device functions, a listing of available alternative treatment interven-
tions, and a description of the marketing history here and abroad, 
including any market withdrawals.61 Due to the level of scrutiny and 
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (l)(B)-(C) (addressing Class II and Class III 
devices). 
55. See id. §§ 360c(a) (1) (B), § 360d (providing examples of performance stan-
dards and discussing how standards are established and recognized); see, 
e.g., 21 C.F.R. § SSS.3070(a) (2) (i)-(iv) (listing the "special controls" for a 
Class III pedicle screw spinal system, which include biocompatibility and 
mechanical testing standards, specific warning labeling and a precaution 
for use by specifically trained and experienced surgeons). 
56. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a) (l)(B), § 360d. 
57. [d. § 360c(a)(1) (C). 
5S. [d. § 360c(a)(1) (C) (ii)(II) (requiring adherence to the PMA process to 
reasonably ensure device safety and effectiveness). 
59. [d. § 360e(c); see also 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b)(3)(v). 
60. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c); see also 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b)(3) (v) (delineating the 
application to include information on clinical investigations involving 
human subjects, as well as other nonclinicallaboratory studies). Reports of 
clinical experimental studies must include information regarding human 
subject selection, study length, and results of statistical analysis, including 
adverse reactions and patient complaints. 21 C.F.R. § S14.20(b) (6) (ii). 
Nonclinical study reports contain information regarding biocompatibility, 
response to use and stress, and device shelf life. [d. § S14.20(b)(6)(i). 
61. [d. § S14.20(b) (3) (i)-(iv). 
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attention to detail, the FDA spends an average of 1200 hours review-
ing and approving a premarket device submission.62 
3. Alternatives to Place Class III Medical Devices on the Market 
Although the PMA process provides a safety net to protect the pub-
lic from unsafe medical devices entering the market, this statutory 
weapon has limited range due to the ability to place a Class III device 
into the stream of commerce by alternative methods. A minority of 
the Class III devices marketed today have undergone the rigorous 
PMA standards.63 
In adopting the Medical Device Amendments, Congress realized 
that devices falling into the Class III category, already in the stream of 
commerce, needed to remain on the market while the FDA com-
pleted the PMA analysis for those devices.64 Market forces65 further 
required that "substantially equivalent" devices to those already in the 
marketplace needed an easier entry than the cumbersome and 
lengthy PMA process.66 In addition, to promote technological innova-
tions, the MDA's scheme integrated an "[e]xemption for devices for 
investigational use" specifically applicable to experimental devices.67 
"Substantially equivalent" Class III devices do not enter the market 
in a completely unfettered fashion. Like new Class I and Class II de-
vices, these Class III devices are subjected to a premarket notification 
submission,68 also referred to as the "S10(k) process."69 The S10(k) 
submission for a Class III device must include the device name, pro-
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (citing the hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce during the 1987 session); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 360e(d) (1) (A) (providing the FDA with up to 180 days to decide 
to approve or deny the application). 
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (relying upon House Reports estimating that 91 % 
of Class III devices introduced between 1976-83 and 80% of devices intro-
duced in 1990 entered the market as "substantially equivalent" therefore 
bypassing the premarket approval process). 
See id. at 477-78 (explaining the rationale for the "grandfathering" provi-
sion for pre-1976 devices, but further adding in footnote 3 that the FDA 
had not yet initiated the process for most Class III devices). 
Congress identified the two market influences behind the "substantially 
equivalent" exception as: (1) fear of market monopolization by manufac-
turers of pre-1976 devices, and (2) the desire to encourage the rapid entry 
of improved existing devices. Id. at 478. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1) (A) (defining "substantial equivalent" as a device 
that has the same intended use, and either (i) the same technological char-
acteristics as an already marketed device; or (ii) different technological 
characteristics but information that demonstrates that the proposed device 
is as safe and effective as the legally marketed device); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. 
at 478 (referring to Congress' intention to permit these specific devices to 
avoid the PMA process). 
21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(I). 
See id. § 360(k) (requiring the submission of a report to the FDA at least 
ninety days before the device's market introduction). 
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posed labeling showing intended use, a statement with supporting 
data, indicating device similarities and differences from comparable 
devices already in commercial distribution, and a financial disclo-
sure.70 If the intended use differs from that of the legally marketed 
equivalent device, the FDA requires an explanation of why the differ-
ences do not affect device safety and effectiveness.71 Overall, the re-
view required by the 510(k) process takes on average twenty hours to 
complete.72 Only if the FDA required the underlying pre-1976 device 
to submit to the rigors of the 510(k) process will the substantially 
equivalent device receive such scrutiny. 73 
The "investigational device exemption" (IDE) allows limited market 
entry of new devices excluded from the rigorous PMA process.74 Pub-
lic health and safety concerns remain, but to encourage discovery and 
development of efficacious devices, Congress implemented this ex-
69. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478 (defining the "premarket notification" as the "[sec-
tion] 510(k) process" because that was the section number in the original 
Act). 
70. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (requiring the comparative device summary to in-
clude problems related to safety and effectiveness based upon a reasonable 
search of information known or available). 
71. See id. § 807.92(a) (5). 
72. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (relying upon legislative reports of hearings before 
the House in 1987). The Court in Lohr quotes a journal commentator who 
stated that the "[section] 510(k) notification requires little information, 
rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA, and gets processed very 
quickly." Id. (citation omitted); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.100 (requiring the 
FDA to merely determine if the device is or is not substantially equivalent to 
a legally marketed device). But see supra note 62 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the average 1200 hours the FDA requires to complete 
the PMA process. 
73. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478; see also 64 Fed. Reg. 45,155 (Aug. 19, 1999). For 
example, final regulations published on August 19, 1999, require inflatable 
silicone breast implants to undergo the more vigorous PMA process. See 64 
Fed. Reg. 45,155. It is interesting to note that although the FDA identified 
this medical device "as one of the high-priority devices that would be sub-
ject to [the] PMA [process]" on January 6, 1989, proposed regulations were 
not issued until January 8, 1993, and final regulations were not promul-
gated until August 19, 1999. See id. 
74. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)(2) (1994); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 3,732-33. In 1980 
when the FDA published the final regulations governing the IDE exemp-
tion, they responded to comments from the industry concerning the "bur-
dens" placed on manufacturers and investigators by the IDE regulations. 
See id. The FDA justified the regulations as "critical to [the] protection of 
[human] subjects in all investigations" by requiring, among other stan-
dards, "informed consent, institutional review, and reporting of unantici-
pated adverse device effects." Id.; see also, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing 
Sys., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that "[a]lthough in-
vestigational devices are not subject to the rigorous PMA process, they are 
subject to a different set of complex and comprehensive regulations which 
set forth detailed procedures for determining whether investigational de-
vices are safe and effective"). 
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emption to provide optimal freedom to scientific investigators.75 An 
IDE device is exempted from certain FDCA standards including re-
quirements regarding misbranding, premarket notification, perform-
ance standards, and many of the GMPs.76 
Device entry does not, however, occur without any scrutiny. The 
initial IDE application must include, among other things, a descrip-
tion of the manufacturing methods and controls, and copies of all 
device labeling.77 The applicant requesting an IDE must establish, 
maintain and submit reports of data obtained during the investiga-
tional study.78 This data enables the FDA to determine compliance 
with investigational standards, review progress of clinical trials and 
evaluate device safety and effectiveness.79 Throughout the investiga-
tional period, the investigators must personally supervise human stud-
ies and an informed consent from each subject must be obtained, 
except in certain life-threatening or life-saving situations.8o IDE de-
vice approval is denied if the human risk outweighs the anticipated 
benefits to both specific individuals and the public as a whole.81 
III. STATE OR LOCAL STATUTORY PROTECTION FROM MEDI-
CAL DEVICE FAILURE-FACT OR FICTION 
A. Preemption Language oj the MDA 
By enacting section 360(k), Congress preempted any requirements 
established by state and local law that related to a medical device's 
safety and effectiveness, or to any matter included within applicable 
federal requirements that differ from or are in addition to require-
ments under the MDA.82 Federal regulations sought to narrow this 
broad preemptive cloak by restricting preemption of state and local 
75. 21 C.F.R. § B12.1(a) (allowing optimum freedom so long as it is consistent 
with public safety and ethical standards within the medical profession). 
76. [d. 
77. [d. § B12.20; see also id. § B12.5. Specific labeling regulations require not 
only a precautionary statement that the device is for "investigational use," 
but the label must indicate hazards and adverse effects and may not bear 
"false or misleading" statements or indicate that the device is "safe and ef-
fective." See id. 
7B. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). 
79. [d. 
BO. [d. § 360j(g)(3)(C)-(D). 
B1. 21 C.F.R. S B12.30(b) (noting additional reasons for disapproval include 
fraudulent reporting, unsound scientific methodology, inadequate in-
formed consent, or presumed lack of device efficacy). 
B2. Section 360k states: 
State and local requirements respecting devices 
(a) General rule 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or 
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement -
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
2001] Surgically Implanted Medical Device Liability 399 
requirements only in situations where the FDA "has established specific 
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable 
to a particular device."83 
The regulations define "state or local requirements" as those having 
legal effect regardless of whether established through the legislative, 
administrative or judicial process.84 State or local requirements that 
are not "applicable to a device" are not preempted merely because 
they might affect a medical device.85 In addition, requirements equal 
to or substantially identical to federal requirements are not pre-
empted.86 Congress also empowered the Secretary, who then dele-
gated the ability to the FDA, to exempt more stringent state and local 
requirements or those necessitated by local conditions if they did not 
violate federal requirements.87 The federal requirements control ar-
S3. 
S4. 
S5. 
S6. 
S7. 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or 
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable 
to the device under this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994). 
21 C.F.R. § SOS.I(d) (emphasis added). Language quoted from § SOS.I(d) 
which states in part: 
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and 
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations 
or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device 
under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local 
requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addi-
tion to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
Relying on § SOS.1 (b) which states in part: 
[As] a general rule [ ] after May 2S, 1976, no State or political sub-
division of a State may establish or continue in effect any require-
ment with respect to a medical device intended for human use 
having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or 
in addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under 
any provision of the act and which relates to the safety or effective-
ness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement 
applicable to the device under the act. 
[d. § SOS.1 (b) (emphasis added). But see infra notes S6-87 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the term "requirement" utilized in MDA as in-
cluding specific statutory enactments and accompanying regulations, but 
not judicially applied common law. 
21 C.F.R. § SOS.l(d)(l), (3), (6)(ii) (including a laundry listing of exam-
ples ranging from requirements of general applicability such as electrical 
codes, to licensing requirements such as those of the medical board regu-
lating the surgeon who dispenses the device, to requirements prohibiting 
the manufacture of adulterated devices). 
[d. § SOS.l (d)(2). The FDA has responsibility for determining whether a 
state or local requirement is equal to, different from, or in addition to a 
federal requirement. See id. § SOS.l (e) (acknowledging the FDA decision is 
subject to judicial review); see also id. § S08.1 (d) (qualifying the controlling 
nature of the federal regulations in case of a conflict). 
Section 360k(b) states: 
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the 
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and oppor-
tunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this sec-
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eas not covered by an exempted state or local requirement that are 
narrower in scope than the corresponding federal requirements.88 
B. Historic Preemption Analysis as Applied in Medical Device Litigation 
1. Preemption Principles 
Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws are superseded, or, pre-
empted, to the extent that they conflict with federal legislation.89 
Caution must be taken, however, in a preemption analysis because 
finding a "clear and manifest" congressional intent is necessary before 
superseding the "historic police powers of the States."90 Requiring 
this standard has a long history beginning with the 1912 Supreme 
Court case of Savage v. Jones. 91 In Savage, the Court distinguished be-
tween express and implied preemption, finding either sufficient if the 
legislative intent was clearly manifest.92 
In 1947, the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator,93 addressed 
the preemption scope where Congress provided express preemption 
language in the federal.statute.94 Despite the explicit statutory lan-
guage, the Rice Court did not focus on the express language as the 
assessment of congressional intent.95 The Court reasoned that even 
without the express language, congressional intent could be inferred, 
especially when the federal interest dominated state interest or the 
federal legislation was so comprehensive that it precluded the states' 
ability to supplement the legislation.96 
88. 
89. 
90. 
9l. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
tion, under such conditions as may be prescribed in such 
regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision ap-
plicable to a device intended for human use if -
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement 
under this chapter which would be applicable to the de-
vice if an exemption were not in effect under this subsec-
tion; or 
(2) the requirement -
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and 
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause 
the device to be in violation of any applicable require-
ment under this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(b). 
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(f). 
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
[d. (citation omitted). 
225 U.S. 501 (1912). 
See Susan Raeker:Jordan, The Pre-emption that Never Was: Pre-Emption Doctrine 
Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 13"'79, 1384-85 (1998) (tracing in Part II.B. 
the historical judicial preemption analysis). 
331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
[d. at 222-23. 
See id. at 230. 
[d. (noting additionally that state exemption is appropriate when state pol-
icy is inconsistent with federal statutory objectives). 
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In 1977, the Supreme Court addressed federal law preemption ofa 
state regulation in Jones v. Rath Packing.97 This case addressed certain 
net-weight labeling requirements, an area "traditionally occupied by 
the States.,,98 The Rath Packing Court clarified once again that the 
preemption analysis "requires us to consider the relationship between 
state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely 
as they are written."99 
A significant change in the historic preemption analysis occurred 
with the 1992 Supreme Court decision of Cippollone v. Liggett. lOo In 
Cippollone, the Court determined the scope of two statutory preemp-
tion provisions, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965 ("1965 Act") and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969 ("1969 Act") .101 In its preemption analysis, the Court found that 
when Congress, by express language, includes a preemptive provision, 
and the written words reliably indicate congressional intent, no fur-
ther inquiry of intent is necessary. 102 
The 1965 Act expressly prevented "statements" related to "smoking 
and health" that differed from the labeling requirements of the fed-
eral statute. 103 A majority of the Cippollone Court concluded that 
"statement" referred to "only positive enactments by legislatures or ad-
ministrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels."104 The 
1969 Act amended the preemptive language of the 1965 Act by pre-
empting not only "statements" but also "requirement[s] or prohibi-
tion[s] ... imposed under State law."105 In concluding that the new 
97. 430 U.S. 519 (1977). 
98. Id. at 525. 
99. Id. at 526 (reaffirming a finding of preemption as "explicitly stated in the 
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose"). 
100. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
101. See id. at 517. 
102. See Raeker:Jordan, supra note 92, at 1407. 
103. Under the 1965 Act, a section captioned "Preemption" stated in part: 
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the 
statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on 
any cigarette package. 
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required 
in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are 
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act. 
Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added) .. 
104. Id. at 518-19. Justices Scalia and Thomas did not concur with the 1965 Act 
preemption analysis. See id. at 507. 
105. Id. at 515. The 1969 Act modified subsection (b) of the 1965 Act's preemp-
tion provision to state: "[nlo requirement orprohibition based on smoking and 
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conform-
ity with the provisions of this Act." Id. (emphasis added). 
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language preempted some common-law actions, the Court no longer 
reached a majority opinion. 106 
A plurality of the Court decided that federal labeling requirements 
preempted state common-law claims based upon state failure-to-warn 
negligence actions that created legal duties or "requirements" with re-
spect to cigarette promotion. I07 The plurality acknowledged that 
even this expanded preemptive scope did not extend to express war-
ranty or fraudulent misrepresentation claims. !Os 
Although stating that the new principle was to look only to express 
preemption language when provided, the Justices did not confine 
their discussion to the words of the statute alone. In the opinion, the 
Court placed emphasis upon the legislative purpose behind the 1969 
Act, a purpose inferred based on substantive changes regarding label-
ing and advertising.109 Despite this finding of an expanded legislative 
purpose, the Court acknowledged that: (1) Congress did not amend 
the express statutory purposes contained within the Act; and (2) the 
express purposes suggested congressional concern with "positive en-
actments, rather than common-law damages actions."llo 
2. Application in Medical Device Litigation 
One year after the Cipollone holding, the Eastern Division of the Dis-
trict Court of Virginia, in Flynn v. Biornet, Inc., III faced a complaint 
alleging strict liability, negligent design and manufacture, and 
breaches of express and implied warranties.1l2 The device at issue was 
a hip prosthesis, a Class III medical device, which entered the market 
through the extensive PMA processYs Based upon the analysis in Ci-
pollone, the court acknowledged that the "express preemption provi-
sion in the MDA preclud[ed] any reliance upon the doctrine of 
implied preemption."I14 Because of the extensive federal standards 
106. [d. at 521-23. Only four Justices, Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, White and 
O'Connor, could agree on the preemptive analysis of the 1969 Act. See id. 
at 507. 
107. [d. at 524. 
108. [d. at 531. Express warranty claims do not create "requirements" as they are 
not state-imposed but rather "contractual commitment[s] voluntarily un-
dertaken." [d. at 526. Fraudulent claims do not relate to "smoking and 
health" but rather to "the duty not to deceive." [d. at 528-29. 
109. [d. at 520 (reasoning that these changes broadened the preemptive scope 
of section 5(b». 
110. [d. at 521 n.19. Section 2, created by the 1965 Act and unchanged by the 
1969 Act, lists two statutory purposes: "(1) adequately informing the public 
that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health, and (2) protecting the 
national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and 
confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations." [d. at 514 n.9 (em-
phasis added). 
111. No. CIVA 93-192,1993 WL 540570 (E.D. Va. July 23,1993). 
112. [d. at *3. 
113. [d. at *5; see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
114. Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *5. 
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regarding device design, manufacturing, and labeling under the PMA 
process, the court found that any state warranty laws or common-law 
tort actions based on negligence imposed "additional" or "different" 
requirements,1l5 and therefore were preempted by the MDA's express 
languagey6 Summary judgment was granted for all of the claims,1l7 
although the court noted that express warranties extending beyond 
required FDA labeling could survive preemption. I IS 
Other courts addressed the issue of preemption for Class III medi-
cal devices entering the market under a PMA exception. Experimen-
tal devices were distinguished from those undergoing the PMA 
process by the California Court of Appeals in Evraets v. Intermedics In-
traocular, IncY9 The court found that IDE devices were not subjected 
to the "usual [FDA] safety and efficacy requirements," but to their 
own set of regulations "intended to encourage innovation" in device 
development, and therefore balanced the potential health risks of a 
product against its potential medical treatment benefits.120 Following 
the lead of Cipollone and others, the court was concerned about the 
impact of tort liability actions placing additional "requirements" upon 
device manufacturers, serving to hamper innovation and frustrate the 
legislative purpose for creating this exception.121 But even more im-
portantly, the court noted that strict liability and negligence claims 
are "predicated on the notion that a manufacturer has a duty to mar-
ket a safe product," contrary to the IDE process recognizing the need 
for clinical trials to determine if the device is safe.122 Conversely, for 
the same reason these claims failed under a preemption analysis, war-
ranty claims survived because" [a] ny guarantees of fitness as to investi-
gational devices would not be imposed by the FDA but rather could 
only be provided directly to consumers by the manufacturer."123 
Even Class III devices entering the market through the less rigorous 
51O(k) "substantially equivalent" process were considered subject to 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at *5-*7. See supra note 82 for the preemption language within the 
MDA. 
117. Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10. 
118. [d. at *7 (quoting King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir. 
1993) ). The court announced in dicta that even the strict liability claim 
would be preempted. [d. at *6. Virginia law, however, prohibited strict lia-
bility recovery, thus, the court could not rule on that claim. [d. 
119. 29 Cal. App. 4th 779, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (1994). 
120. [d. at 785, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855; see also supra Part II.B. 
121. Evraets, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 786-87, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56. 
122. [d. at 787, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. 
123. [d. at 789,34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (concluding that their reasoning is analo-
gous to how the Cipollone Court handled the express preemption claim). In 
addition, the Evraets' court found that a medical device manufacturer could 
not "claim the shield of preemption" when it had knowingly misled the 
FDA to obtain approval. [d. at 790-91, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. The court 
also upheld claims based upon the manufacturer's failure to adhere to fed-
eral regulations. [d. at 794, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860. 
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federal requirements capable of exerting preemptive effect. In Duvall 
v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb CO./ 24 ("Duvall!'), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's claims for 
breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty based on FDA-
mandated requirements, defective design and manufacturing and fail-
ure to warn were preempted.125 The court determined that because 
the 510(k) "notification process" required manufacturers to indicate, 
upon application, proposed labeling, design and manufacturing 
processes, and to continue adherence to those standards, the "notifi-
cation process" imposed requirements on the particular medical de-
vice. 126 Therefore, self-created manufacturing standards, reported to 
the FDA through the "notification process" created binding federal 
requirements capable of preempting state requirements. 127 
With few claims surviving preemption because of the extensive fed-
eral medical device regulatory scheme,128 some courts did not even 
find the need to discuss how the device entered the market. In Martin 
v. American Medical Systems, Inc.,129 the plaintiff alleged strict liability, 
negligence and breach of warranty claims.130 The court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendant based upon precedent,131 without 
any discussion of the specific federal requirements applicable to this 
particular medical device. 132 
C. Stirring the Waters: The Supreme Court's Preemption Analysis In Decid-
ing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 
Simply identifying the express preemptive language in the statute 
and accompanying regulations and relying upon previous Supreme 
Court rationale is insufficient to resolve questions regarding MDA pre-
emptive scope. Debate regarding this issue is easily found and reaches 
beyond the language in the statutes and regulations. In 1996, the Su-
preme Court struggled to determine the prospective standard for a 
preemption analysis of state claims related to federally controlled 
124. 65 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, vacated, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996), 
and remanded, 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter "Duvall!']. 
125. Id. at 401. Once again, the court did not find preemption of express war-
ranties regarding device performance made voluntarily by the manufac-
turer instead of by state law. Id. (relying on the Cipollone reasoning). 
126. Id. at 399-400. 
127. Id. 
128. See, e.g., Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396,397 (D. Md. 1994) affd 
in part rev'd in part, 82 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing cases both prior and 
subsequent to Cipollone finding MDA preemption of "state-law based causes 
of action"). 
129. 923 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
130. Id. at 90. 
131. Id. at 91 (citing Duvall I for the holding that the MDA preempts state law 
when state law imposes requirements on a medical device that are different 
or additional to those imposed under the MDA). 
132. See id. 
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medical devices. Although reaching majority and even unanimous 
conclusions, the Court was unable to agree beyond a plurality opinion 
on the rationale to guide a preemption analysis. 
1. . The Beginning of the Debate: Background Facts 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,133 the Supreme Court granted certiorq,ri to 
determine which, if any, of the cross-petitioner's claims against the 
manufacturer were preempted by the MDA provisions.134 The initial 
complaint filed by the Lohrs in 1993 alleged common-law negligence 
claims for defective design and manufacture and failure to warn, and 
strict liability claims for unreasonably dangerous design and defective 
manufacture. 135 
Lora Lohr required the surgical implantation of a cardiac pace-
maker in 1987 to ensure proper heart functioning. 136 The device se-
lected for implantation was a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with a 
Model 4011 lead. 137 Ms. Lohr required emergency surgery on Decem-
ber 30, 1990 due to pacemaker failure allegedly causing a "complete 
heart block."138 Her doctor presumed the lead caused the device 
failure. 139 
The initiation into the market of the Model 4011 pacemaker's lead 
began in October 1982, when Medtronic notified the FDA that they 
were seeking an exemption to the pre market approval process under 
the "substantially equivalent" 510(k) process. 140 Medtronic was 
granted approval to market the device on November 30, 1982, follow-
ing the FDA concurrence that the device was substantially equivalent 
to a pre-1976 device. 141 In their letter to Medtronic, however, the 
FDA emphasized that FDA approval to market should not be consid-
ered a safety endorsement of Medtronic's product.142 
133. S18 U.S. 470 (1996). 
134. Id. at 484 & n.6 Uustifying their decision by citing a string of cases demon-
strating the discrepancy of holdings by various circuits). 
13S. Id. at 481 (noting breach of warranty theory alleged in the complaint was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim); see also Kramer v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., S20 So. 2d 37,39 (Fla. 1988) (noting the abolishment of a common-
law implied warranty claim for personal injury with the adoption of the 
strict liability doctrine). 
136. Lohr, S18 U.S. at 480. 
137. Id. (discussing the lead function to transmit an electronic signal from the 
pacemaker generator to the heart, thereby controlling the heartbeat). 
138. Id. at 481. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 480. 
141. Id. 
142. The FDA also noted that the Medtronic device would be subjected only to 
the general controls for Class III devices marketed under the "substantially 
equivalent" exemption. Id. For a discussion of the controls applicable to 
all medical devices and specific information related to the section SI0(k) 
process for "substantially equivalent" devices, see supra Part II.B. 
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2. Unanimity Among th~ Justices 
Faced with express preemptive language, the Court had to deter-
mine the intended legislative MDA preemptive scope: defective design 
claims.143 Despite the differing opinions regarding preemption analy-
sis principles, the Lohr Court reached unanimous agreement on two 
of the Lohrs' claims. 144 . 
The Lohrs presented a persuasive argument that manufacturers of 
devices entering the market under the 510(k) process were not sub-
jected to federally imposed design requirements. 145 Without federal 
standards there could be no preemption of the state defective design 
claims. 146 
In addition, negligent manufacturing and labeling claims, insofar as 
they allege a statutory violation or a regulatory requirement violation, 
are not preempted.147 The Court acknowledged that a state cause of 
action seeking to enforce federal standards, whether imposed by the 
MDA or the underlying FDA regulations, does not impose a require-
ment "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements. 148 
3. The Majority Opines 
Recognizing that the preemption analysis began with the express 
statutory language, the Court majority quickly identified the need to 
review the language within the context of two underlying presump-
tions regarding preemption.149 First, when Congress legislated in do-
mains traditionally occupied by the several states, there was an 
assumption that state power usurpation did not occur unless there was 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484 (identifying that their task was similar to the that of 
the Court in Cipollone). 
Id. at 513. 
fd. at 492-93 (agreeing that the section 510(k) process requirements are 
"not sufficiently concrete to constitute a pre-empting" and noting that the 
design of the Model 4011 pacemaker lead was never analyzed from a safety 
or efficacious perspective). The majority further reasoned that because 
Congress intended the section 510(k) process to "maintain the status quo" 
and equalize competition for marketing equivalent devices, manufacturers 
of post-1976 equivalent devices would be subject to the status quo of de-
fending against common-law claims for defective design. Id. at 494 & n.14. 
The dissent took an even stronger position that the section 51O(k) process 
"places no 'requirements' on a device." Id. at 513; see also supra note 50 for 
a discussion of the focus of the 510 (k) process on equivalence-providing a 
comparative analysis. 
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494, 513 (declaring the majority and dissenting 
opinions). 
fa. at 497, 513 (declaring the majority and dissenting opinions). Through-
out this Comment, references to "labeling" or "failure-to-warn" claims are 
utilized interchangeably to reflect the differing language used in case 
opinions. 
!d. at 495-97, 513 (stating the majority and dissenting reasoning). 
fd. at 484-85 (citing Cade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 
111 (1992». 
2001] Surgically Implanted Medical Device Liability 407 
a "clear and manifest" congressional intent.150 Second, to determine 
congressional intent, the Court looked not only at the preemption 
provision and "the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole," 
but also performed a reasoned analysis of how Congress intended the 
federal act to impact upon business, consumers and the law. 151 The 
Lohr Court m~ority agreed that state common-law negligent manufac-
turing and failure-to-warn claims were not preempted.152 Under the 
federal regulations, medical device manufacturers needed to adhere 
to good manufacturing practices and comply with labeling 
requirements. 153 
The Lohrs argued that the general nature of these requirements 
carry no preemptive effect over duties imposed by state common law 
for the manufacturel54 ofa specific device because section 360k(a) (1) 
expressly referenced a requirement "applicable to the device" not to 
devices in general.155 They also relied upon the statutory language of 
section 360k(a) (2), preempting only those requirements relating to 
the device safety and effectiveness or a matter included in a device-
specific requirement. 156 
The majority conceded that federal requirements must apply to a 
specific device to preempt counterpart state requirements and that 
general state requirements would only be preempted where they place 
150. Id. at 485 (discussing several Supreme Court cases supporting this proposi-
tion, but noting dissenting opinions that hold that the presumption should 
only apply when deciding if preemption is intended at all, not when analyz-
ing preemptive scope). 
151. Id. at 485-86 (citing several cases supporting this presumption). But see dis-
cussion supra Part III.B.2. The Lohr Court, like many before, utilized the 
often quoted Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947), opinion requir-
ing a "clear and manifest" Congressional purpose to supersede the historic 
state police powers. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. Mter tracing a thorough history 
of preemption analysis, including implied preemption considerations, Su-
san Raeker:Jordan questions the Lohr stretch to look at the impact on busi-
nesses and consumers reasoning that going to such lengths raises questions 
as to how "clear and manifest" is Congressional intent. See Raeker:Jordan, 
supra note 92, at 1419. 
152. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502. 
153. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
154. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501 (noting that the manufacturer's general duties are to 
use due care, to avoid foreseeable danger, and to inform users of risks in-
volved in the use of potentially dangerous items). But see Duvall 1,65 F.3d 
at 399 (finding the GMPs involving manufacturing facility standards, quality 
assurance program, mandatory device failure reporting and federal label-
ing regulations create requirements giving rise to federal preemptive ef-
fect). In addition, the Duvall I court held that the 510(k) notification 
process, which requires manufacturers to include proposed labeling and 
maintain the device design and manufacture as represented, has preemp-
tive effect. See id. at 399-400. 
155. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360k. 
156. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360k. 
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a substantive requirement on a particular device. 157 Thus, the state 
common-law manufacturing and warning duties escaped preemption 
because their generality placed such requirements outside the scope 
envisioned by the government. 158 
4. Plurality Rationale for Limiting the Scope 
From this point forward the Justices became very fractured in their 
preemption analysis. 159 Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and Gins-
berg ("Four Justices") focused attention on the congressional intent 
behind the selection and use of the word "requirement."160 
These Justices addressed the Cipollone opinion as that case deter-
mined, in part, the meaning behind the word "requirement" used in a 
preemptive statutory context.161 Broad interpretation of "require-
ment" to include judicial decisions by the Court in Cipollone62 was 
considered distinguishable, as the narrowly focused preemptive stat-
ute had minimal impact upon state sovereignty.163 The Lohr case was 
157. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500. Utilizing statutory construction, the dissent might 
have found preemption of all the Lohr's common-law negligent manufac-
turing and failure-to-warn claims. The dissent views the GMPs and labeling 
regulations as quite extensive and certainly specific enough to meet the 
preemptive terms of section 360k(a). Id. at 513-14. 
158. See id. at 501-02 (noting general common-law duties are not the type of 
"requirements" Congress or the FDA feared would impact the enforcement 
of specific federal standards). Additional understanding of this conclusion 
may be gleaned from the Court's discussion in Part IV of the opinion, when 
Medtronic advanced the argument that all common-law causes of action 
create a "requirement" that imposes duties "different from, or in addition 
to" the federal standards. Id. at 486. Four Justices responded that Med-
tronic's statutory construction could result in complete immunity to manu-
facturers for defective devices. In addition to closing the state door by 
barring common-law claims, the MDA provides no express and probably no 
implied private right of action to persons injured by defective devices 
thereby closing the federal door. Aside from a general doubt that Congress 
intended to protect an industry that it determined required more stringent 
regulation, these four Justices found no support for Medtronic's argument 
in the statutes, plain language, or accompanying legislative history. Id. at 
487. 
159. See id. at 503-05. 
160. Id. at 486 (referring to the preemption language in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) 
(1994) that says, "no State ... may establish or continue in effect with re-
spect to a device intended for human use any requirement"). For complete 
statutory language, see supra note 82. 
161. See id. at 488 & n.8. 
162. Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992) (discussing the "require-
ment" definition of the case and how such a definition "sweeps broadly" 
and encompasses statutory enactments, regulatory interpretations, and ju-
dicial decisions). 
163. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 488; see also Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 919 P.2d 410, 
414 (1996) (contrasting the broad MDA statute to the narrowly focused 
cigarette labeling statutes construed in Cipollone). For a discussion of pre-
Lohr cases extending "requirement" as used in the MDA to encompass com-
mon-law claim, see supra note 111-32 and accompanying text. The Lohr 
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further distinguished because "requirements" was utilized throughout 
section 360k of the MDA in a context suggesting targeting at specific 
positive law enactments versus judicially applied common law.164 Fur-
thermore, the Four Justices reasoned that if such a broad preemptive 
scope was envisioned, the legislators would have chosen more precise 
language. 165 
164. 
165. 
Court did not attempt to rewrite history but merely employed a stare decisis 
analysis to follow other announced preemption principles. See, e.g., 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). In discussing congres-
sional intent to preclude state common-law remedies, the Silkwood Court 
found it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, re-
move all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." 
Id. at 251; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (cit-
ing Silkwood and noting that even the Silkwood dissent agreed with this con-
cept). Other courts have interpreted Silkwood to require "a presumption 
against preemption if it would deny an injured party all judicial remedies, 
especially in the face of congressional silence." Montoya, 919 P.2d at 412 
(deciding the MDA preemptive scope between the time the Lohr case was 
argued and the Court announced the result). But see Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., 
No. CIVA 93-192,1993 WL 540570, at *10 (E.D. Va. July 23,1993) (find-
ing congressional "failure to provide a federal remedy will not defeat [Con-
gresses' J intent to preempt state law"). Furthermore, the Court m~ority 
determined that even if the MDA statutory language was found to be am-
biguous, deference to the FDA interpretation would be appropriate, yield-
ing the same result. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. De! Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984». 
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489-90 & n.ll (emphasizing section 360k(a)(2) pre-
empting state statutory enactments and regulations "pursuant to the MDA" 
and section 360k(b) and the corresponding regulations at 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 808.53-808.101 providing the exceptions to preemption, none of which 
include common-law claims). See also 21 U.S.C. § 360. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487. It is worth noting the differing opinions among the 
Justices regarding the frequency, or lack thereof, of common-law duty pre-
emption by the MDA as well as the differing analyses of the remaining Jus-
tices. The Four Justices considered it rare that a common-law duty would 
be preempted, as the Court's judgment would most likely not result in the 
imposition of a device-specific substantive requirement. Id. at 502-03. Jus-
tice Breyer provided a slightly different analysis concluding that preemp-
tion of common-law claims may not be so rare as stated by the plurality. Id. 
at 508. He cautioned that a court must not be granted greater power than 
state officials to establish state requirements "different from, or in addition 
to" federal requirements. Id. Justice Breyer highlighted the similarity be-
tween state regulatory standards and standards of care established in state 
tort actions and notes that a similar analysis should be utilized to determine 
preemptive effect. Id. He provided, hypothetically, a federal standard re-
quiring the use of a two-inch hearing aid wire and argued that such a fed-
eral requirement should preempt not only a state regulation setting a one-
inch standard but also prevent a court from finding liability based upon 
expert testimony that use of greater than a one-inch wire would be negli-
gent. Id. at 504. The dissent, focusing on the express statutory preemption 
language, found the language to be unambiguous and admonished the 
Court's, including Justice Breyer's, deference to the narrowly focused 
agency interpretation. See id. at 512. Determining that state common-law 
actions operate to require compliance with common-law duties and there-
fore impose "requirements," the dissent concluded that preemption should 
occur where the requirements differed from federal standards. Id. at 509. 
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Turning to the legislative history, Medtronic cited language in a 
House report to argue that MDA preemption extends to common-law 
claims because a corollary purpose of enactment was to prevent sti-
fling of technological innovations through "unnecessary restric-
tion."166 The Four Justices rejected this argument. Recognizing that 
legislators were "acutely aware" of ongoing products liability litigation, 
these Justices relied upon the absence of any decision in the legislative 
history expressing concern that "product liability actions would ham-
per" technology and language acknowledging that "at least some 
common-law claims" survived MDA preemption to reach their 
conclusion. 167 
The majority agreed with the Lohrs' argument that even if "require-
ments" included state common-law claims, those "requirements" are 
not preempted unless they are "different from, or in addition to" the 
federal standards.168 Although recognizing that a claim based upon a 
state common-law violation may require proof of certain elements, 
these additional "state requirements," though technically "different 
from," merely made the state requirements narrower.169 Their posi-
tion was supported by FDA regulations that limit preemption to situa-
tions where there are "specific" counterpart regulations or "specific" 
The dissent relied on the Cipollone majority conclusion that state common-
law damages actions did impose "requirements," finding no distinction be-
tween enacted law andjudicialiy established duties. Id. at 510. The dissent 
further rejected the plurality emphasis on device-specific requirements 
pointing to the absence within the statute of any reference to specificity. Id. 
at 511-12; see also 21 U.S.c. § 360k. 
166. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490 (explaining that H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 12, was cited 
in petitioner's supporting brief). Although acknowledging that an objec-
tive was to encourage innovation, the Four Justices focused on what they 
believed to be the key purpose of the MDA, which was "to provide for the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices." Id. (relying on the MDA ex-
press statutory language). Susan Raeker:Jordan raises the question regard-
ing what conclusions the plurality would have made if they had focused on 
Medtronic's argument that the MDA intended to protect technological in-
novations "from being stifled by unnecessary restrictions, and that this in-
terest extended to the pre-emption of common-law claims." Raeker:Jordan, 
supra note 92, at 142l. 
167. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490-91 (referring to records of the "hearings, the Commit-
tee Reports, [and] debates"). The Four Justices instead interpreted "re-
strictions" to indicate fear of additional regulatory burdens rather than 
imposition of common-law duties upon manufacturers. Id. at 490. Addi-
tional support was gleaned from the lack of contemporary commentary 
viewing the MDA as having a broad sweeping preemption of common-law 
claims. Id. at 491 n.13. 
168. Id. at 495 (referring to statutory language in section 360k(a) (1»; see also 21 
U.S.c. § 360k. 
169. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 (distinguishing from state requirements that broaden 
federal standards and thus refusing to extend the preemptive scope by pro-
viding a literal interpretation of "different from"). The Court further 
noted that a damages remedy merely provides an impetus to comply with 
overlapping state and federal law. Id. 
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requirements for a particular device.170 Because Congress empow-
ered the FDA to promulgate regulations consistent with the MDA and 
to interpret the scope of preemption under section 360k, congres-
sional deference required substantial weight to be given to the 
agency's interpretation.171 
D. The Aftermath: Attempts to Explain and Apply the Lohr Analysis 
Prior to Lohr, most courts analyzing the preemptive scope of section 
360k(a) found broad preemption of state common-law claims. l72 The 
Lohr Court upset this stability in an analysis that deviated from the 
road map provided by Cipollone. 173 In addition, the Lohr dissent ar-
gued that the Court deviated from the Court's analysis in Chevron USA, 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 174 The "fractured hold-
ing"175 in Lohr has left the legal community grappling to find clear 
language to guide future preemption analysis. 176 As a result, courts 
170. Id.; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
171. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying especially on delegated duties that require the 
FDA to analyze the preemptive effect of the federal standards upon state 
laws i.e. section 360k(b) providing statutory authority for the FDA to ex-
empt state regulations from preemption and 21 C.F.R. § 808.5 allowing the 
issuance of advisory opinions regarding preemption of a state require-
ment); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Lohr majority 
acknowledged that it is both the congressional delegation of power to the 
FDA and the ambiguity in the statute that supports deference to the 
agency's interpretation. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (relying on the standard es-
tablished in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Rres. De! Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) and Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CN.A. 93-192, 1993 WL 540570 (E.D. 
Va. July 23,1993». The dissent argued that the statutory language is clear 
and therefore "resort[ing] to the agency's interpretation is improper." 
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). 
172. See Scott W. Sayler & Steven M. Thomas, Post-Decision Diagnosis: Medical De-
vice Preemption Alive and Mostly Well After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 6 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 185, 186 (1997); see, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 
F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting the initial holding pre-Lohr that the 
plaintiff's common-law claims for breach of implied warranty, breach of ex-
press warranty based on FDA-mandated requirements, defective design and 
manufacturing and failure to warn were preempted by the express statutory 
language of section 360k(a» [hereinafter "Duvall If']; see also supra Part 
III.B. 
173. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. But see supra note 143 and ac-
companying text. 
174. The dissent suggested that the majority denied deferring to the regulations, 
but merely utilized the regulations to "inform" them on the meaning of the 
preemptive statute. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). 
175. Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 185 (referring to the four separately 
written opinions). 
176. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997) (rec-
ognizing its obligation to adhere to Supreme Court holdings but adding 
that the "holding in [Lohr] contains several ambiguities that impair our 
ability to perceive with absolute clarity the path that the Court has chosen 
for us to follow"). 
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apply different standards to determine preemption, citing Lohr for 
support. 
1. A Simplistic Two-Prong Inquiry 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Oja v. 
Howmedica, Inc. 177 interpreted the Lohr opinion to require a two-prong 
inquiry to determine state-law preemption.178 The first prong of the 
inquiry focused on the federal requirement, allowing preemption 
only if the federal requirement is device-specific. 179 The second 
prong focused on the state requirement, allowing preemption only if 
the state requirement is (1) device specific or a general standard that 
establishes substantive requirements for a specific device, and (2) 
"'different from, or in addition to' a federal requirement."180 
Applying the two-prong inquiry to the facts, the Oja court deter-
mined that the FDA "requirement" restricting marketing for non-ce-
men ted use satisfied the first prong inquiry of a federal device-specific 
requirement.181 Despite finding a device-specific federal require-
ment, the court found that the state common law survived preemp-
tion because the elements of the second-prong inquiry were not 
satisfied. 182 
177. 
178. 
179. 
180. 
181. 
182. 
III F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Id. at 788. On appeal, the court addressed three claims-negligence, negli-
gent failure to warn and strict liability-against Howmedica, Inc., the man-
ufacturer of the Porous-Coated Anatomic One-Piece Acetabular 
Component hip (PCA hip) surgically implanted into Maureen Oja on July 
2, 1984. Id. at 784-85. Upon removal of the PCA hip on July 29, 1992, 
necessitated by Oja's severe pain, the surgeon discovered that the PCA hip 
staking peg was missing, the polyethylene liner had separated from the 
metal cap, and debris from the disintegrating lining was scattered through-
out Oja's hip joint. Id. at 785. 
Id. at 788 (recognizing that the Lohr Court's analysis relied on both the 
statutory language of section 360k and regulatory language of § 808.1 (d». 
Id. 
Id. at 789. The PCA hip entered the stream of commerce initially under 
the 51O(k) process after Howmedica, Inc., submitted a premarket notifica-
tion to the FDA on April 25, 1983. Id. at 78~7. The FDA granted final 
approval on August 10, 1983, conditioned on marketing and promotion of 
the PCA hip for use only in conjunction with low-viscosity cement. Id. at 
787. The federal "requirement" was therefore not restricted to standards 
established through legislative enactment or regulatory rule making but 
was viewed by this court to encompass administrative policy decisions, in-
cluding those provided in private letters to specific manufacturers. Id. at 
789. 
Id. (adopting the reasoning of the LohrCourt that the general duty to warn 
purchasers of potentially dangerous items is not the type of state "require-
ment" that would interfere with the federal interest advanced by the MDA). 
In addressing the defective manufacturing claim based upon a strict liabil-
ity theory, the Oja court reversed the directed verdict for Howmedica, Inc. 
Id. at 793. Although not required to apply the two-prong inquiry to reach 
this decision, the holding indicates that the claim most likely survives pre-
emption, otherwise there existed no reason for reversal. 
2001] Surgically Implanted Medical Device Liability 413 
2. A Three-Condition Test 
An unpublished Fifth Circuit opmlOn discussed in Lewis v. In-
termedics Intraocular, Inc. 183 provided a different test, based upon the 
Lohr analysis, for determining when preemption exists. 184 Lewis re-
quired a finding of three conditions for state-law preemption to occur: 
(1) a federal device-specific requirement, usually in the form of a reg-
ulation, (2) a state safety and effectiveness requirement or any other 
federal requirement applicable to the device, with "requirement" re-
ferring to statutes, regulations, ordinances, or common-law duties, 
and (3) "the state requirement is different from, or in addition to, the 
federal requirement."185 In addition, this test is to be applied to any 
medical device regardless of the mechanism utilized to enter the mar-
ket.186 Applying the test, the only claim to survive preemption was the 
argument that Intermedics violated FDA regulations.187 Finding that 
a judgment regarding the state-law defective design claim could im-
pose "requirements" different from the detailed regulations gov-
erning the design process for IDE devices, the court determined that 
preemption was appropriate. I88 
183. 
184. 
185. 
186. 
187. 
188. 
19 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. La. 1998) [hereinafter "Lewis If']. 
Id. at 626 (determining that any Fifth Circuit MDA preemption analysis 
must not only occur within the context provided by Lohr but also as that 
opinion was interpreted by Lewis v. Intennedics, No. 95-31080, slip op., 114 
F.3d 1182 (5th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter "Lewis r]). 
Id. at 628. 
Id. at 628-29 (noting that Lewis I demands application of the test for devices 
undergoing premarket approval or entering through the exceptions cre-
ated by the 510(k) and IDE processes); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (Dec. 12, 
1997) (proposing an interpretive rule to clarify the FDA's "longstanding" 
position regarding preemption in light of the confusion created when the 
Lohr Court did not "definitively decide" the preemptive scope for devices 
entering the market via the PMA or IDE paths). These proposed FDA regu-
lations may have influenced courts like Lewis I because, in the discussion 
supporting the need for the regulation, the FDA explicitly stated that the 
preemption analysis in Lohr is applicable to any device, regardless of how 
the device entered the market. See Lewis II, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (noting 
that state common-law claims generally are not preempted by the MDA). 
But see supra note 150. 
See Lewis II, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 629. In this case, five plaintiffs alleged defec-
tive design, failure to warn and breach of warranty for severe eye damage, 
including blindness in one case, from surgically implanted intraocular 
lenses manufactured by Intermedics. Id. at 626. The particular 44B lens is 
a Class III medical device that entered the market through the IDE process. 
Id. at 627. Lewis I interpreted Lohr to unequivocally find no preemptive 
effect of claims based upon violations of FDA regulations, and the record 
reflected that Intermedics failed to notify investigators that the "44B design 
was under attack" and failed to warn of potential problems experienced 
during the investigational study. Id. at 629-30. 
Id. at 630 (reviewing the congressional purpose of the IDE process to en-
courage research and development, recognizing the need for experimenta-
tion because of the inherent lack of a known safe and effective designs as 
well as other court holdings that common-law claims impose requirements 
different from IDE regulations). 
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3. A Complex Two-Prong Analysis 
In addition to courts grabbling to create a clear and objective pre-
emption analysis consistent with Lohr, various commentators have at-
tempted the same task. In one publication worth noting, authors 
Scott Sayler and Steven Thomas utilize key language to fashion yet 
another test. 189 Their test, in essence, is a more detailed two-prong 
analysis. Federal requirements will typically have a preemptive effect 
provided that they: (1) are device specific, and (2) "constitute 'specific 
counterpart regulations' to state law .... "190 State requirements will 
typically be preempted if they: (1) are "developed 'with respect to 
medical devices;'" (2) have specific applicability; (3) are "different 
from or in addition to federal requirements;" and (4) are "concerned 
with safety, efficacy, or any other matter included in a federal require-
ment that applies to the device."191 Although not in a situation to 
apply the test, Sayler and Thomas believe that a careful analysis be-
tween the state and federal requirements in question would find the 
preemption defense viable for devices entering the market through 
either the PMA or IDE processes. 192 Defining the "regulation-inten-
sive" "device-specific" PMA and IDE processes as "safety-oriented 
mechanisms," state common-law claims would likely create "require-
ments" that conflict with the specific federal interests articulated 
through regulatory standards.193 The authors also caution that future 
cases dealing with devices entering the market through the 510(k) 
process need to include an analysis of any changes to the labeling and 
GMP regulations made after the Lohr decision, as well as, any changes 
to the 510(k) process, especially the adoption of regulations focusing 
on safety.194 
189. See Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 185. 
190. Id. at 190. 
191. Id. (noting the specific applicability requirement acts as a savings clause for 
requirements of "general applicability"). 
192. Id. at 208; see also supra notes 60-62, 77-81 and accompanying text. 
193. See Sayler & Thomas, supra note 172, at 200. Although admitting that the 
Lohr Court never directly announced that the holding was applicable only 
to devices that enter the market through the 51O(k) process, the authors 
find the LohrCourt's lengthy attention to the 510(k) process indicative of a 
narrow holding. See id. at 195-96. Furthermore, they caution against ex-
tending the holding to factually dissimilar cases such as situations in which 
devices entered the market through the PMA or IDE processes. Id. at 195. 
But see id. at 204 & nn.89, 101,206 (acknowledging various cases, including 
a Fourth Circuit case decided post-Lohr, in which the courts reached differ-
ent conclusions regarding devices entering the market through the PMA 
and IDE processes). 
194. Id. at 201. Speculating that future federal requirements would most likely 
not dictate product design, the authors surmise that defective design claims 
would escape preemption. Id. at 208. They immediately noted, however, 
the likelihood of other defenses available to manufacturers including the 
proposed draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restate-
ment (Third)"). Id. Compare Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 
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IV. EXPLORING VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION: FACTORS TO 
CONSIDER 
The complexity of Class III medical device litigation is exacerbated 
when plaintiffs allege multiple causes of action against manufactur-
ers.195 At times, court opinions combine claims or utilize different 
nomenclature to discuss specific claims, thus creating obstacles to un-
derstanding the court's reasoning for their conclusions. As a result, a 
better understanding of preemption and medical device litigation can 
be achieved by exploring each cause of action separately.196 
Although emphasis is placed on preemption, the reader should not 
lose sight of other hurdles facing the injured plaintiff. Proving causa-
tion is not an easy task for plaintiffs.197 With delay in identifying the 
cause as proximately related to the medical device, and the potential 
for class action litigation, there also exists statute of limitation 
problems.198 Furthermore, because medical devices reach the ulti-
mate consumer in a somewhat unusual manner, additional considera-
tions need to be explored before initiation of an action against others 
in the distribution chain. 199 
195. 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199. 
N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Ill. 1999) (holding that the PMA process does not im-
pose device specific design requirements because the design "originate[s] 
solely with the manufacturer of the device, not the FDA"), with Salazar v. 
Medtronic, Inc., No. CIVA C-96-425 , 1997 WL 1704284, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 8, 1997) (deciding "any claim challenging the design" would be pre-
empted because the PMA process contains specific federal device design 
requirements). See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996) (alleging negligence 
and strict liability); Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 
1999) (alleging breach of express and implied warranties, fraud and negli-
gence) [hereinafter "Talley If']; Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 326 (alleging breach 
of express warranties, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose, strict liability for defective design, defective 
manufacture, and failure to warn, and negligent design, manufacture, pro-
motion, and sale); Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-192, 1993 WL 
540570, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 23, 1993) (alleging breach of implied warranty 
of merchantability, negligent design and manufacture, breach of the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express war-
ranty, strict liability, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress). 
See infra Part IV.A-D. 
See generally Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that there was no breach of implied warranty under which plaintiff 
could recover damages for injuries sustained using disinfectant manufac-
tured by the defendant); Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644, 
647 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
defendant's failure to warn plaintiff's doctor of alleged risk of Guillain-
Barre Syndrome associated with its product was the cause-in-fact of her in-
jury); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Ac-
tions: Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 401, 466-
82 (2000) (discussing various alternative tort causation doctrines and their 
applicability to the medical malpractice claims). 
See infra Part IV.F. 
See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text. 
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A. Common-Law Breach oj Duty and Negligence Per Se 
Negligence claims relating to design, manufacture, and failure to 
warn against the medical device manufacturer for devices that reach 
the market through the 510(k) process are currently not preempted 
based on the LohrCourt's analysis and its outcome.200 Breach of duty 
creates a cause of action that may constitute a "requirement" that is 
preempted when there is a conflict between the state requirement 
and a device-specific federal regulation or statutory requirement.201 
State common-law claims pertaining to 510(k) devices currently sur-
vive preemption because these devices are subjected only to "general" 
federal manufacturing and labeling requirements.202 
Even though broad preemption of many negligence claims oc-
curred prior to Lohr,203 there remained some remedies available to 
the plaintiff.204 A claim of negligent contamination of a medical de-
vice was likely to survive preemption.205 In addition, negligent surgi-
cal implantation or removal claims fall outside the preemptive scope, 
although these are medical malpractice and not products liability 
claims. 206 
To defend a negligence claim based upon unreasonably dangerous 
design, the manufacturer must prove that prevailing safety standards 
were met, not that the "safest conceivable design" was utilized.207 Al-
though issues of defective design are usually determined by a jury, if a 
plaintiff fails to show a safety standard violation the defendant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.208 
Although uninsulated by the preemptive cloak of section 360k(a) 
for negligent failure-to-warn claims, manufacturers receive some pro-
tection through the "learned intermediary" doctrine.209 This doctrine 
provides an exception to the manufacturer's general duty to warn 
200. See Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 (finding "little difficulty" concluding, based 
upon the Lohr reasoning, that the state-law claims advanced by Duvall re-
garding negligent design and manufacture and failure to warn were not 
preempted by section 360k(a». 
201. See id. (developing me rule to utilize from a summation of me Lohr 
analysis). 
202. See id. (referring to the GMPs and labeling requirements contained in 21 
C.F.R. §§ 801,820 (1996». 
203. See, e.g., Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 82 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1996); Duvall I, 
65 F.3d at 401; Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-192, 1993 WL 540570, 
at *6 (E.D. Va. July 23, 1993). 
204. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
205. See Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10; see also infra note 239. 
206. See Flynn, 1993 WL 540570, at *10. 
207. Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 725, 731 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd by, 
179 F.3d 154 (4m Cir. 1999) (relying on Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 
111 F.3d 1174 (4th Cir. 1997» [hereinafter "Talley /']. 
208. Id. 
209. See Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162 (relying on Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 
1276 (5th Cir. 1974». 
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consumers about risks associated with product use.210 The doctrine's 
scope may be limited to warning of potential risks and, therefore, may 
not extend to situations where the manufacturer fails to inform the 
consumer that a new and improved device has entered the market.211 
Under the doctrine, for products requiring surgical implantation by 
the physician, the manufacturer owes a duty to warn the physician 
only and not the ultimate consumer.212 The doctrine is based on 
sound policy reasons identifying that the learned professional is in the 
best position to provide an assessment of the benefits and risks to each 
patient for the various medical products available to treat their condi-
tion.213 Support is gathered from the practical reality that it is virtu-
ally impossible for manufacturers to provide adequate patient 
warnings.214 
In order for the learned intermediary doctrine to be applied, the 
physician must indeed be an intermediary, which is described as "an 
intervening and independent party between patient and drug manu-
facturer."215 When there is an existing relationship between the physi-
cian and the manufacturer, whether the physician falls within the 
category of intermediary is determined by exploring the nature of the 
relationship.216 Particular emphasis is placed on the extent to which 
210. 
211. 
212. 
213. 
214. 
215. 
216. 
Id. 
In determining the validity of a strict liability claim, the Fourth Circuit 
noted that strict liability focuses on a failure to disclose risks associated with 
the particular device in question making discussion of alternative options 
irrelevant. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1233 (4th Cir. 1984). 
Although not deciding a negligence claim, the court articulated that a neg-
ligence claim based upon failure to inform of an alternative might be sus-
tained. Id. 
Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162. Hospitals also receive protection from the 
"learned intermediary doctrine" because the hospital personnel do not se-
lect the device to be utilized and the manufacturer's warnings are directed 
only to the physician using the device. See Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp., 
No. ClV. A. 92-3180-17,1993 WL 1156110, at *6 (D.S.C.Jan. 7,1993) (de-
termining that the hospital was a "sham defendant" for purposes of 
diversity) . 
See Talley II, 179 F.3d at 162-64 (quoting Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 
F.2d 642, 644 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981». 
See id. (citing Hill v. Searle Lahratories, Inc., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 
1989) to note that (1) inclusion of written warnings within the product 
packaging could not ensure receipt by the patient because the product is 
applied by the physician, and (2) even if able to provide written warnings to 
each product user, the warnings are often too technical for an informed 
decision regarding product use). 
Id. (quoting Hil~ 884 F.2d at 1070). Talley advanced the argument that as a 
consultant to Danek, the financial connection rendered Dr. Mathews, her 
surgeon, incapable of independence from Danek thus eliminating the doc-
trine as a defense. See id. 
Id. at 163-64. The consultative services provided to Danek by Dr. Mathews 
consisted of designing and facilitating FDA approval of endoscopes and 
serving as an instructor for surgical techniques utilizing products manufac-
tured by Danek and others. Id. at 157. Annual compensation included an 
income of $250,000, certain paid research and travel expenses, and receipt 
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the physician is allowed to make independent medical decisions re-
garding device use.217 The learned intermediary doctrine may pro-
vide no protection if the physician is too closely related, such as being 
an agent, to the manufacturer.218 
In Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc.,219 ("Talley IF') the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that committing 
an FDA violation by marketing a device for off-label use does not con-
stitute negligence per se.220 The court first acknowledged the differ-
ence between statutory violations that amount to a breach of tort duty 
supporting a negligence per se claim and statutory violations of admin-
istrative requirements that do not support such a claim.221 Although 
determining that some FDA violations create negligence per se 
claims,222 obtaining FDA medical device approval is viewed as an ad-
ministrative requirement setting no substantive standard, and there-
fore negating a negligence per se claim. 223 The Talley II court gathered 
of 25,000 shares of Danek company stock. Id. Dr. Mathews explained that 
his decision to utilize the Dyna-Lok Device was based upon the individual 
patient circumstances, further noting his preference for the device because 
of its predictability, ease of application and of use in surgical teaching, and 
cost effectiveness. Id. The record reflected Dr. Mathews' use of other spi-
nal fixation devices or no device at all when performing spinal fusions. Id. 
at 157, 164. 
217. Talley II, 179 F.3d at 163-64. 
218. Id. at 163. 
219. 179 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 1999). 
220. Id. at 161. Mter two prior failed back surgeries, Talley agreed to a third 
operation consisting of a spinal fusion through the use of a Dyna-Lok De-
vice, a medical device marketed by Danek Medical. Id. at 156. This particu-
lar device was recommended by Dr. Mathews, who intended to attach the 
device to the spine pedicles to enhance Talley's potential for a successful 
spinal fusion. Id. At the time of her surgery, although approved as a Class 
II device, the Dyna-Lok was not FDA-approved for use as a spinal fixation 
device. Id. at 160. Other pedicle screw fixation devices were Class III de-
vices according to the FDA. Id. Talley argued that committing an FDA 
violation by marketing a device for an unapproved use constitutes negli-
gence per se under Virginia law. [d. at 156, 160. Finding the negligence per se 
doctrine inapplicable is consistent with the principles established in the 
newly published products liability Restatement, articulating that statutory or 
regulatory noncompliance is a factor to be considered but not automati-
cally decided as a matter of law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(b). 
221. Talley II, 179 F.3d at 161. The court provides some conceptual illustration 
of the difference by comparing a duty to abide by the standard of care 
requirement, established through enactment of a speed-limit law with ad-
ministrative requirements, such as obtaining a license or filing a report, 
that do not create tort duties. [d. at 158-59. 
222. Id. at 161 (citing the decision in Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 
455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) that a substantive care standard, similar to the 
standard created by a speed-limit law, was created by the FDA requirement 
to correctly label the size of a surgical nail). 
223. [d. (noting that approval alone does not create a substantive requirement 
but rather functions as "a tool to facilitate administration of the underlying 
regulatory scheme"); see also Hartwell v. Danek Med., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 
703, 705 (W.D. Va. 1999) (citing comments in a final FDA rule, 63 Fed. 
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additional support for its decision by concluding that FDA approval is 
analogous to a licensing requirement to sell a medical device.224 Fur-
ther, the trend among Virginia courts is to resolve licensing infringe-
ments by demonstrating a lack of causation.225 
Because of the type of FDA violation alleged, the Talley II court 
never directly opined about preemption of claims based upon FDA 
violations.226 Through one unpublished opinion and dicta in Duvall 
II, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Lohr required a finding that 
claims alleging violation of state-law duties that parallel FDA require-
ments are not preempted.227 
B. Breach of Warranty 
Breach of warranty claims fall within one of several categories: 
breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty based upon 
FDA-mandated labeling and promotion requirements, and breach of 
express warranty based upon the manufacturer's voluntary representa-
tion of their product. 228 The breach of warranty claims could be 
based upon statutory duties under language similar to Article II of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or obligations created under com-
mon law.229 The Lohr Court's analysis is controlling, at least with re-
spect to devices entering the market through the 510(k) process, 
despite the fact that the Lohr Court did not have to address breach of 
warranty claims.230 
The FDA requires certain statements be utilized in the promotion 
of medical devices. 231 For a device entering the market through the 
510 (k) process, manufacturers must submit proposed labeling and ad-
vertising information to the FDA.232 If the device meets the "subs tan-
Reg. 40026, 40036-37 Guly 27, 1995), acknowledging off-label use of pedi-
cle fixation devices as an appropriate standard of care used by many 
surgeons). 
224. Talley II, 179 F.3d at 159-60. The Talley II court cautioned against trivial-
izing an FDA violation because causation might be determined for infringe-
ment of a regulation controlling medical device quality or proper labeling. 
Id. at 161. 
225. Id. at 159-60. 
226. See generally Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, SIS U.S. 470, 49S (1996). 
227. Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 423124, at *1-*2 
(4th Cir. July 30, 1996) (per curiam) (noting that even the Lohr dissent 
agreed with this position); Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 n.4 (acknowledging 
that is was not necessary to decide the issue because any claim based upon 
an FDA violation was waived when not presented to the district court). 
228. See infra text accompanying notes 231-46. 
229. See infra text accompanying notes 231-46. 
230. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 330 & n.5. 
231. 21 C.F.R. § SOl (noting general labeling provisions); see also supra note 70 
and accompanying text for a discussion of labeling requirements. 
232. 21 C.F.R. § S07.S7(e). 
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tially equivalent" criteria, the green light to market creates FDA-
mandated labeling and promotion requirements.233 
In Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb CO.,234 the court quickly found that 
express warranty claims based upon FDA-mandated statements re-
quired for "substantially equivalent" devices are not preempted be-
cause neither the 510(k) notification process nor the general labeling 
requirements carry preemptive effect.235 Although not having to rule 
on the merits of the express warranty claim based on oral representa-
tions, the court affirmed the decision that such claims are not pre-
empted.236 Even prior to Lohr, under the broader preemptive cloak, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that an express warranty claim based 
upon promises voluntarily offered by the manufacturer were not pre-
empted under section section 360k(a).237 The contractual "require-
ments" of an express warranty are self-imposed by the manufacturer, 
not "imposed under State law."238 
Likewise, the Duvall II court determined that breach of implied war-
ranty claims survive preemption, relying on the rationale in Lohr.239 
Similarly, the court in Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc.,24o based 
their decision on Lohr's reasoning that the 510(k) process does not 
eliminate common-law liability in part because nothing in the 510(k) 
233. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 332. To create an FDA labeling requirement through 
the issuance of a private letter to the manufacturer see supra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
234. 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996). 
235. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 332 (determining the Lohrdecision as explicitly dictat-
ing such a position although not having to rule on the merits, and thus 
finding no error in the district court's granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Bristol-Myers-Squibb). In 1990 Duvall had an inflatable penile 
prosthesis manufactured by Bristol-Myers-Squibb implanted, however, mal-
functioning of the prosthesis required subsequent surgical removal. Id. at 
326. This particular prosthetic device entered the market through the sec-
tion 510(k) process after successfully completing clinical trials under the 
IDE exception for Class III devices. Id. at 328. Bristol-Myers-Squibb argued 
that Lohrwas not controlling because this device was tested under the rigor-
ous IDE regulations prior to requesting section 510(k) status. Id. at 330. 
The court was unpersuaded because nothing in the MDA statutory scheme 
indicated that IDE requirements remain in effect after the experimentation 
exception expires. Id. Duvall II dealt with an express warranty claim, based 
on information contained in a promotional brochure utilized by Bristol-
Myers-Squibb, to advertise their product. Id. at 33l. 
236. Id. 
237. Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 82 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1996); Duvall!, 65 F.3d at 
400-Ol. 
238. Duvall I, 65 F.3d at 400 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 
504,525-26 (1992)). 
239. Duvall II, 103 F.3d at 329-30. Although the Lohr Court did not address a 
claim for breach of implied warranty, the Court referenced an FDA regula-
tion listing the UCC warranty of fitness as a type of state regulation that 
survives section 360k(a) preemption. Id. at 330 n.5. 
240. 116 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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process connotes an FDA endorsement regarding device safety and 
efficacy. 241 
In deciding Martin, the court addressed a breach of warranty claim 
based upon a Virginia statute limiting, as a defense, lack of privity in 
an action for breach of express or implied warranty.242 In Martin, the 
manufacturer extended a limited warranty to the physician responsi-
ble for medical device surgical implantation.243 The Fourth Circuit 
determined that this express warranty claim survived preemption thus 
allowing Martin to rely upon the Virginia statute to determine the 
manufacturer's warranty scope and validity.244 The court also held 
that the warranty formed the basis of the bargain even though the 
plaintiff was unaware of the express limited warranty prior to the liti-
gation.245 Regulatory language demonstrates the FDA position that 
241. Id. at 103-04 (vacating the district court's decision and remanding for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with the opinion that the breach of implied 
warranty claim is not preempted by the MDA). After suffering from erec-
tile dysfunction, John Martin agreed to surgical implantation on June 2, 
1993, of the Dynaflex inflatable prosthesis manufactured by American Med-
ical Systems. Id. at 103. The Dynaflex is a Class III device that entered the 
market through the 510(k) process. Id. at 103-04. After sustaining an in-
fection that did not respond to conventional treatment, Martin had the 
prosthesis surgically removed. Id. Continued complications from the infec-
tion necessitated five hospitalizations for various surgical interventions leav-
ing Martin with a shortened and disfigured penis. Id. at 103. Martin based 
the implied warranty claim on the premise that the Dynaflex would be dis-
tributed in a sterile condition safe for implantation. Id. at 103-04. 
242. Id. at 104-05. The Virginia statute at issue states: 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense 
in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods 
to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or 
for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods 
from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manu-
facturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, 
or be affected by the goods .... 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Michie 1950). See generally Richard E. Speidel, 
The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Commercial 
Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804, 813-41 (1965) (discussing privity through the in-
terface of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") § 402A and 
the Uniform Commercial Code in products liability suits). See also U.C.C. 
§ 2-318 cmt. 2 (explaining that rule of privity does not preclude certain 
beneficiaries from receiving the same benefit of warranty that the buyer 
received in the contract of sale). 
243. Martin, 116 F.3d at 103 n.l (referencing the warranty, "the AMS Dynaflex 
Penile Prosthesis ... [is] delivered to the hospital prefilled and sterile"). 
244. Id. at 104. The court relied on Lohrto overturn the district court's holding. 
See id. The district court determined that although the claim was not pre-
empted per se because Martin was unaware of the AMS limited warranty, any 
judgment in his favor would be based solely on Virginia state law thus fail-
ing under the preemption analysis. Id. 
245. Id. at 105 (citing Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992) to support 
factual findings that: (l) an awareness that the physician or hospital is not 
the ultimate user prevents American Medical Systems from relying on their 
limited warranty language, and (2) "Martin surely did· rely on and expect 
the fact warranted to be true: Le. the implant was sterile"). 
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warranty claims based upon obligations articulated in the VCC are 
untouchable by section 360k(a) preemptive scope.246 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to extend liability to 
a health-care provider based upon breach of warranty claims under 
the VCC as it applies to transactions in goods and not to services.247 
Under a similar analysis, a hospital providing services, including the 
use of a surgical suite and the purchasing of a medical device for the 
surgeon, escaped liability under a VCC warranty claim.248 
C. Fraud 
Fraud claims take many forms and in a competitive market as the 
temptation to commit fraud lurks at every corner. For example, manu-
facturers can make fraudulent misrepresentations during the FDA ap-
plication and approval process including false statements and fraud 
through active concealment.249 Regardless of the FDA status of their 
device, the potential exists to utilize fraudulent marketing and promo-
tional techniques. For example, manufacturers could overstate the 
performance or clinical uses of a device, or fail to inform users of risks 
identified with device use. Although not specifically requested to ana-
lyze a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the Lohr Court opined that 
fraud claims would most likely survive preemption.250 
246. 
247. 
248. 
249. 
250. 
The MDA "does not preempt State or local requirements of general appli-
cability where the purpose of the requirement relates to products other 
than devices (e.g., requirements such as general electrical codes, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness», or to unfair trade prac-
tices." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d) (1). 
See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 503 S.E.2d 445, 452 (S.C. 1998) 
(supporting their holding with lower court and other jurisdictional deci-
sions and statements in learned treatises). It is worth noting that this case 
was heard under writ of certiorari finding the issues to be both novel legal 
questions and issues of great public interest. Id. at 447 & n.2. 
See Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp., No. ClV.A.92-3180-17, 1993 WL 
1156110, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 1993) (determining that the hospital was 
"sham defendant" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Here, the court 
determined that the plaintiff could not recover against an in-state hospital 
for strict liability and breach of implied warranties because the hospital was 
not engaged in the sale of goods, therefore, the South Carolina Commer-
cial Code was inapplicable. Id. at *4-*6. Because the court found the in-
state hospital a "sham defendant," removal of the case against the hospital 
and manufacturer to federal court did not destroy complete diversity. Id. at 
*l. 
21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(c) (1) (A)-(G) (West Supp. 1999) (listing information 
that should be included in an application for premarket approval of Class 
III devices). In practice, fraud may occur by a failure to disclose informa-
tion required by sub-sections (A) through (G) or by making misleading 
statements about this information. 
Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 n.19 (1996). 
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The potential also exists for manufacturers to conspire with others 
within the industry to enhance success of market penetration.251 Con-
spiracy objectives may include: (1) placing medical devices into inter-
state commerce without proper FDA approval, (2) promotion of a 
medical device marketed under the IDE exception as safe and effica-
cious, and (3) device promotion through deceptive and misleading 
conduct. 252 
In Wade v. Danek Medical, Inc.,253 although the Eastern District of 
Virginia did not have to consider conspiracy claims, the court noted 
its intention to follow the court's analysis in Coleman v. Danek Medical 
Inc.254 The dismissal of a claim based solely on a theory of conspiracy 
to violate the MDA is warranted because the statute creates no private 
right of action.255 But promotion of a non-FDA-approved, Class III 
device through unlawful means, such as through active concealment, 
would create a fraud claim recognized by most states.256 Further-
more, the medical associations remain unshielded by the protection 
afforded physicians because a seminar presenter, who happens to be a 
physician, is not practicing medicine.257 
251. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL 
186325, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (including a discussion of conspiracy 
theories, differentiating between a vertical conspiracy among the defendant 
and consulting engineers or surgeons from a horizontal conspiracy among 
the defendant and similar manufacturers or medical associations). 
252. See Coleman v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 629, 630-31 (S.D. Miss. 
1998) (citing In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 186325, 
at *3 ). 
253. 5 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
254. Id. at 383 (referring to the analysis in Coleman v. Danek Medical, Inc., 43 F. 
Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 1998». The complaint in Wade named as defend-
ants a number of medical associations claiming that they unlawfully con-
spired with the device manufacturers in the promotion of pedicle screw 
fixation devices to medical providers. Id. at 381 & n.1. The court never 
reached the conspiracy issue because the case was dismissed as untimely. 
Id. at 382. 
255. See Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 632; see also Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 
S.E.2d 88, 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (cautioning against interpreting Lohr as 
creating an implied private cause of action for MDA violations). 
256. See Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 632-33 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screws 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 186325, at *11 and noting that the record con-
tained allegations of several material facts actively concealed at medical as-
sociation seminars, that some of the instructors had financial incentives to 
promote the pedicle screw fixation devices carrying the potential for relay-
ing biased or inaccurate information, and that the lack of FDA approval for 
the specific use of this device was withheld). 
257. See id. at 633-34 (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 396 exempting the practice of 
medicine from the MDA). Section 396 provides: "Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care 
practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a pa-
tient for any condition of disease within a legitimate health care practi-
tioner-patient relationship." 21 U.S.C. § 396 (1994 & Supp. N 1999). 
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D. Liability Without Fault 
Strict liability claims for unreasonably dangerous products or defec-
tive designs are likely to survive preemption unless the FDA decides to 
dictate specific medical device design standards.258 The initial fear 
raised by Lohr is surely lessened by the learned legal community's 
adoption of liability principals in the Restatement (Third).259 The new 
Restatement raises the bar for finding manufacturer liability for harm 
resulting from the sale or distribution of legally sold and medically 
prescribed defective medical devices.26o 
The standard requires the medical device to have "so little merit" 
that a reasonable health-care provider would not prescribe the medi-
cal device because the defective design renders the device unsafe or 
ineffective to any class of patients.261 The design is not considered 
defective even if certain groups of patients would sustain harm by us-
258. See supra note 186. 
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.(1998). 
260. See id. § 6. Section 6, entitled "Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices," 
states: 
[d. 
(a) A manufacturer of a ... medical device who sells or otherwise 
distributes a defective ... medical device is subject to liability 
for harm to persons caused by the defect. A ... medical device 
is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only 
pursuant to a health-care provider's prescription. 
(b) For purposes of liability under subsection (a), a ... medical 
device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution 
the ... medical device: 
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or 
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in 
Subsection (c); or 
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or 
warnings as defined in Subsection (d). 
(c) A ... medical device. is not reasonably safe due to defective 
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the ... medical 
device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable thera-
peutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing 
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe the ... medical device for any class of patients. 
(d) A ... medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate 
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings 
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: 
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a 
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with 
the instructions or warnings; or 
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to 
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to 
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instruc-
tions or warning. 
261. See id. § 6 cmt. b. Section 6(b) (1) refers to a manufacturing defect as de-
fined in Section 2(a). The text of section 2(a) appears in its entirety at 
infra note 265. 
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ing the medical device.262 By providing adequate warnings of una-
voidable risks to medical personnel, the manufacturer is protected. 
Patients, through discussion with their physician, are assumed to be 
able to make an informed choice as to whether to accept the risk or 
seek alternative treatment.263 
In order for a manufacturer to prevail in a liability action, it must 
only prove that an informed and reasonable health-care provider 
would recommend the particular medical device to at least one pa-
tient. 264 Should the manufacturer be unable to meet this minimum 
burden, the plaintiff may prevail under a strict liability theory. 265 
Strict liability is used based on the theory that plaintiffs have difficulty 
proving device defects and negligent manufacturing, and the manu-
facturer is in a better position to absorb the cost of injury.266 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that strict liability for 
defective design does not apply to health-care providers who utilize 
these products while rendering medical treatment.267 Under the 
South Carolina statute, "[0] ne who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer .... "268 The decision turned on whether health-
care providers were considered "sellers of products" or "providers of 
services" when utilizing devices in the course of rendering medical 
treatment.269 Although the health-care provider recommended the 
device and surgical procedure, the product and professional services 
were a package deal to the ultimate consumer.270 The consumer was 
262. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b. 
263. See id. § 6 cmt. d. 
264. Id. § 6 cmt. f. (emphasis added). 
26S. Section 2(a) states as follows: 
§ 2. CATEGORIES OF PRODUCT DEFECT 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it 
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defec-
tive because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care 
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the 
product; 
Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added). 
266. See id. § 2 cmt. a. 
267. See In re Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., S03 S.E.2d 448, 4S1 (S.C. 1998). 
Although finding little opposition to their position, the court cited a Mis-
souri Court of Appeals decision holding that strict liability attaches to any-
one, including a hospital, placing the product in the stream of commerce 
by sale or any other means. See id. at 4S0 & n.S. 
268. Id. at 447 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § lS-73-10 codifying almost verbatim, 
Restatement (Second) § 402A). 
269. Id. at 448 (acknowledging that prior case law found "providers of services" 
not strictly liable under the South Carolina Code). 
270. Id. at 449 (following their analysis with a number of supportive leading 
cases from other jurisdictions). 
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incapable of purchasing the product independent of the surgical ser-
vice.271 Likewise, hospitals are insulated from strict liability claims.272 
E. Causation Issues 
The use of expert testimony to prove causation is essential to avoid-
ing summary judgment for many medical device liability claims. 273 
Choosing a qualified expert is of utmost importance.274 In granting 
summary judgment the court in Hartwell v. Danek Medical, Inc.,275 de-
termined that expert testimony of two physicians was sufficiently unre-
liable and therefore inadmissible.276 This decision was based on the 
fact that the expert was not versed in the surgical procedure at is-
sue.277 In addition, the expert did not personally examine the plain-
tiff, did not interview the surgeons who performed the procedures 
and did not review the radiographic studies.278 One physician, testify-
ing about an orthopedic procedure, was not even board-certified as an 
orthopedic surgeon.279 
Further, the court opined that expert testimony needed to state 
proximate causation in terms of reasonable probability.280 It is insuffi-
cient to merely testify that the surgery "did not achieve the desired 
results.,,281 The expert must discuss other potential causes that were 
considered and determined to not feasibly be the proximate cause.282 
Even claims that do not require expert testimony require proof of 
causation to sustain the claim.283 In Coleman v. Danek Medical Inc., the 
plaintiff claimed that a defective pedicle screw fixation device at-
tached to the pedicle of her spine caused her physical injuries.284 In 
addition, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants conspired with the 
manufacturers to promote, market, and sell the devices to medical 
providers. The court granted summary judgment on the fraudulent 
27l. 
272. 
273. 
274. 
275. 
276. 
277. 
278. 
279. 
280. 
28l. 
282. 
283. 
284. 
Id. 
Pleasant v. Dow Corning Corp., No. CIV.A.92-3180-17, 1993 WL 1156110, at 
*2 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 1993). 
See Darrell L. Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 
5-6 (1991). 
See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(indicating the power of medical expert testimony to prove causation); 
Friendship Heights Assoc. v. Koubek, 785 F.2d 1154, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 
1986); Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating 
that expert testimony is required to establish a standard of medical care 
and a violation of that standard). 
47 F. Supp. 2d 703 (WD. Va. 1999). 
Id. at 716. 
Id. at 708. 
Id. at 708, 712. 
Id. at 713. 
Id. at 707. 
Id. at 709. 
Id. 
See 63 AM. JUR. 2n Products Liability § 47 (1996). 
Coleman v. Danek Medical Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 629, 630 (S.D. Miss. 1998). 
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concealment claim because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to 
show causation.285 
F. Statute of Limitation Concerns 
Often, a surgically implanted medical device is utilized after the pa-
tient sustains an i~ury or disabling disease. For instance, a hip pros-
thesis may be utilized for a fracture or a pacemaker because of a 
slowed heart rate.286 Even with surgical interventions, symptoms may 
not immediately be relieved.287 It may be some time before the pa-
tient realizes that their continued symptoms may be due to a defective 
device.288 In Smith v. Danek Medical, Inc.,289 the plaintiff alleged de-
sign defect and argued that the cause of action began to accrue when 
the device became dislodged.290 Following Virginia law, the court de-
termined that the statute of limitations begins to run when the initial 
injury is sustained.291 This fIxes the accrual for dangerous design to 
begin at the time of surgical implantation, even if more serious resul-
tant device injury occurs at a later date.292 
Moreover, an allegation of defective device raises the potential for 
class action litigation thus creating some additional statute of limita-
tion concerns. In Wade v. Danek Medical, Inc.,293 the court, hearing a 
diversity action, decided whether to apply federal or state law regard-
ing equitable tolling of the statute of limitation during the pendancy 
of federal products liability litigation.294 Acknowledging that many 
states allow equitable tolling during the pendancy of a class action suit 
in their own state, the court indicated that few states have addressed, 
and even fewer have allowed "crossjurisdictional" equitable tolling.295 
Finding that Virginia has no interest in furthering the efficiency of 
another jurisdiction's class action procedures, and expressing concern 
285. [d. at 635. 
286. See JOYCE M. BLACK ET. AL., MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING CLINICAL MANAGE-
MENT FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE 2110-12 (5th ed. 1997). 
287. [d. 
288. [d. 
289. 47 F. Supp. 2d 698 (w'D. Va. 1998). 
290. [d. at 701. The plaintiff, a forty-seven-year-old former mechanic, initially 
injured his back in 1983 and sustained a re-injury in 1991. [d. at 699. In 
1992 at the recommendation of his physician, Mr. Smith underwent spinal 
fusion with a Texas Scottish Rites Hospital (TSRH) spinal fixation device, a 
device not FDA-approved for use by attachment to the spine pedicles. [d. at 
699-700. Although receiving some relief, the surgery was not a complete 
success, and in 1994 Mr. Smith began experiencing extreme pain. [d. at 
700. A radiographic examination revealed that the TSRH device was no 
longer attached to the spine and surgery to remove the device was per-
formed the next day. [d. 
291. [d. at 701. 
292. See id. 
293. 182 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 1999). 
294. [d. at 286. 
295. [d. at 287. 
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about the potential flood of litigation following class action dismissal, 
the court determined that Virginia would not adopt a crossjurisdic-
tional tolling rule.296 Thus, under an Erie analysis, plaintiffs' claims 
were time barred following Virginia's "adopted" rule against equitable 
tolling. 297 
V. CONCLUSION 
Certainly, Lohr provided a divergent path from the previously set-
ded case law regarding preemption of many common-law liability 
claims for injuries sustained from medical devices. 298 As with most 
legal concepts where intelligent minds differ, the Lohr Court plurality 
based their preemption analysis on principles announced by the Su-
preme Court in prior cases.299 Within their own analysis, however, the 
Court neglected to seriously consider all articulated legislative pur-
poses behind the MDA enactment.300 
The history of food and drug regulation from 1906 to the present 
indicates increased legislative concern to control medical device stan-
dards to ensure safety. Indeed, safety concerns are the foundation 
upon which the Lohr Court based its support for the legislative intent 
to provide a remedy to those negatively impacted from device fail-
ure.30l The other legislative goal, to foster innovation, however, 
should not be lost in the analysis.302 The age of computers and artifi-
cial materials development provides an opportunity to create an ever-
increasing number of sophisticated medical devices; devices that may 
be more prone to malfunction by virtue of their complexity. The pub-
lic has the right to expect innovation, and development efforts should 
not be unduly hampered by litigation threats. There needs to be a 
correct balancing of the risks and benefits, requiring courts to analyze 
the federal intent to balance the goal of patient protection against the 
need for innovation.303 
Perhaps even more unsetding is the legal community's response to 
such a landmark case.304 Among the cases that follow Lohr, although 
acknowledging the differing paths for medical device market entry, 
there is litde attention to whether the Lohr "2-prong" or "3-condition" 
test is the correct analysis for devices entering through the IDE excep-
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 290. 
298. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
299. See discussion supra Part III.B.l. 
300. See supra notes 151, 157 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra Part IIA 
302. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
303. This is especially important for devices under the IDE exception, where 
Congress specifically recognizes that experimentation would not be needed 
if the safest and most effective devices were already available on the market. 
See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra Part III.D. 
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tion or the PMA process. Both IDE and PMA devices traverse a route 
far different from the 510(k) process examined in Lohr. Courts need 
to consciously decide if extension is appropriate. Even with claims 
involving a device marketed through the 510(k) process, the discus-
sion is void of analysis as to regulatory changes, since the Lohr deci-
sion, that might impact the outcome. 
Specifically, within the Fourth Circuit, the history post-Lohr is de-
void of cases regarding devices that have completed the rigorous PMA 
process. This result was not unexpected because so few devices fall 
outside of one of the PMA exceptions. Courts required to address 
liability claims resulting from PMA devices should tread lightly before 
applying the Lohr analysis. 
Lastly, attention should focus on the response to the principals es-
poused in the new Restatement. Certainly, many lives are saved by tech-
nological advances from medical devices that are more sophisticated. 
The increased complexity, however, is often accompanied by graver 
consequences when failure occurs. Will the green light provided by 
the Restatement (Third) enhance scientific technology by providing a 
safety net for the manufacturers to become creative, or will the desire 
to protect consumers guide the courts to ensure remedies exist unless 
expressly removed by Congress? 
Donna M. Senft 
